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INTRODUCTION (*) 
Talks on Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) opened 
in Vienna on March 9, 1989 under the umbrella of the 35-nation Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Inaugurating these negotia-
tions was a direct consequence of the Third CSCE Follow-Up Conference in 
Vienna that had adopted, only two months earlier (January 15, 1989) a Final 
Document that included provisions for further CSBM discussions. As one 
of numerous <<interesessionaI activities» of CSCE, the CSBM talks are 
mandated to « ... expand the results already achieved at the Stockholm Con-
ference with the aim of elaborating and adopting a new set of mutually 
complementary confidence and security-building measures ... to reduce the risk 
of military confrontation in Europe». 
The Stockholm Accord of September 22, 1986 among the 35 CSCE 
states had greatly pushed forward the ideas of prior notification of exer-
cises, and of their observalion and limited air and ground challenge inspections 
withoul lhe right of refusaI. Such principIes, aplied in Stockholm lO a limited 
exlenl, are meant lo be widened in Vienna. 
CSBMs have been seen as means by which lo enhance the openness 
and prediclability of military activities. A comprehensive exchange of troop 
and weapons deployment data to enhance transparency, Iower thresholds for 
exercices to be observed and inspected, and heightened conlacts and communi-
cation were among NATO's initiaI gaaIs at the outset af talks in early 1989 ('). 
(.) The author wishes to acknowledge lhe helpful comments ar Jennone Walker, 
Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment fdr Intemational 'Peace. 
(I) These goals were originaUy stated in the communique that was issued following 
NATO Foreign Ministers met in Brussels 00 December 8-9. 1988. See NATO Press Communique 
M-3 (88) 75. it:Conventianal Arms Control: Statement Issued by the North Atlantic Council Mceting 
in Ministerial Session at NATO Headquarers, Bl'ussels (8th-9th December 1988)>>. More recent1y, 
these aims were outlined in the U. S. Department of State's Fact Sheet (March 1990), 
entitled «US,Soviet Relations: Arms ContraI Negotiations». 
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As the revolutionary changes within Eastern Europe proceeded in 
1989-90, however, the kind and extent of CSBMs required for security in the 
new configuration of Europe have affected proposals and negotiations. ln this 
brief discussion, I review the positions taken by Warsaw Pact members in 
the first year of the CSBM talks, hilight the «case» for an expanded 
notion of CSBMs suggested by the uncertain politico-military environment of 
Eastern Europe, and consider several of the principal CSBM ideas thus far 
aired by countries such as Hungary and Czechoslovakia. 
CAUTION TO SELF - INTEREST lN NSWP CSBM POSlTIONS 
ln the first three rounds of CSBM talks, the NATO states tabled a 
number of specific proposals, while members of the Warsaw Treaty Orga-
nization (WTO or Warsaw Pact) were reluetant to go beyond proposing 
constraints on the frequency, size duration and proximity of military exer-
cises. The sides readily cooperated, however, in planning a 3-week (January 
16-February 5, 1990) «Military Doctrine Seminar» held in Vienna. That 
seminar involved ali 35 states engaged in the CSBM negotiations. This event 
built on 1989 initiatives from many of the 35 to enhance openness and 
stress reassurance concerning peaceful intentions. Specific topies at the 
first of such seminars included the «posture and structure of armed forces, 
military activities and training, budget and planning» ('). 
Positive results were achieved through such a meeting, although the 
\VTO members (especially Poland) stressed throughout their concern that 
NATO's doctrines - e. g., Follow-on-Forces-Attack «<FOFA») - were, in 
fact, oriented towards oHense. Among WTO members, Hungary and Czechos-
lovakia were particularly active leading up to and during the Military 
Doctrine Seminar, and they found themselves with Neutral and Non-Aligned 
(NNA) states in arguing for regularizing meetings of the Seminar. 
Behavior of the seven Warsaw Pact members, however, had begun 
to exhibit autonomy in 1989 as communist party governments fell. A consi-
derable degree of diversity had long existed within the WTO, of course ('). 
(2) lnstitute for Defense and Disannament Studies, Vienna Fax, Janual'lY 12, 1990, p. 2. 
(1) See Daniel N. Nelson, Alliance Behavior in the Warsaw Pact (Boulder: Westview. 
1986). 
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Yet, alI six non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) states began to exbibit both 
Iheir new-found sovereignty and their newly discovered insecurity. Tbe recog-
nition dawned on each new government that principal external Ihreat 
was very often emanating from lheir WTO allies. Bulgaria might be the 
exception to such a rule, with Turkey being perceived as a primary threat. 
Neverlheless, lhe intra-WTO tensions are significant and potentialIy volatile. 
To help diffuse such within-region dangers, and to reduce the levei of 
potential conflict, East Europeans have endorsed ideas for CSBMs that apply 
to lhe entire ATTU area or to Easl-Central and Southeastern Europe speci-
ficalIy. Many of these ideas are little more than restatements of Western 
positions. For example, «the first instance of a joint proposal co-sponsored 
by a member Df NATO and lhe Warsaw Pact» was a December, 1989 
Franco-Hungarian idea for enlarged contacts and access, wich the West has 
been urging from the outset ('). Further, at the Military Doctrine Seminar, 
Hungarians, Poles and Czechoslovaks spoke Df the need for media scrutiny 
and public control-notions that the West has long accepted as a given in a 
more secure Europe. At other times in 1990, East European CSBM negotiators 
(or foreign ministries) have again raised some old Warsaw Pact arguments, 
singly or as part Df larger packages. Advance notifications and observation 
Df naval and air force exercises is one such re-cycled CSBM idea. 
But the NSWP states have made genuinely new initiatives. The con-
tent Df East European proposals has, one should note, not departed from 
the very general WTO CSBM outlines issued on October 28, 1988 that is, 
before communist regimes were ousted ('). ln that Pact document, mention 
was made of Ihree principale directions for CSBMs: 
1) «Constraining Measures», focused on limiting the size, number, dura-
tion, location and frequency Df exercises, banning the largest maneu-
vers J and Iowering readiness; 
2) «New CSBMs», emphasizing the extension Df prior notification to 
air and naval forces, the expansion of ali CSBMs in the entire 
ATTU area and adjoining seas, oceans and air space, a freeze on 
military budgets, and creation of threat reduction centers; 
(4) See the interview with U. S. Ambassador to CSBM taIks, John Maresca, in 
Arms Control Today (May, 1990), p. 8. 
(S) See «Statement OD CSBMs and Disarmament in Europe», PoliticaI Consultative 
Committee af the Warsaw Treaty Organization. issued in Budapest. October 28. 1988. 
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3) and «measures to increase the openness and predictability of military 
activities», by which the Pact meant data exchange, fuller obser-
vation, communication and personnel visits. 
Some breaks began to occur as Hungarians and Czechoslavaks endorsed 
Swedish ideas - oposed by the URSS - for notifying and observing command 
and staff exercises ('). This is a proposal unlikely to be adopted prior to the 
CSCE Summit because of its controversial nature. Verification would necessi-
tate deep penetration into a eountry's war-fighting preparations and anything 
less, beeause «eommand post exercises ... are not very visible ... » could not be 
adequately verified ('l. Yet, the movement of NSWP eountries away from 
botb intra-Paet cohesion and the USSR's positions during the Fifth Round 
of CSBM negotiations (early 1990) was very significan!. 
After the Fifth Round established four CSBM Working Groups to speed 
(it was hoped) agreements prior to the CSCE Summit, tbe self-interests of 
East- Central and Southeast European states, regardless of alliance membership 
have become dominant faetors. Eaeh of the Groups. chaired by a NNA 
state, offers different advantages and varying dilemmas for the states no 
longer under Soviet suzerainty. 
A few examples underscore tbese variations. One Working Group 
coneerning information exehange and verification is ehaired by Austria. 
W ithin NA TO or the WTO, antagonisms certainly exist that may lessen 
substantially the desire to provide data 01' to allow inspeetions. Enrnity 
between Greeks and Turks, Bulgarians and Turks, and other bilateral dis-
putes. will not be easily surmounted. Similarly, Sweden heads tbe Working 
Gronp devoted to observation and notifieation of exercises. The Poles have 
cxhibited, as have the Bulgarians and Romanians, less interest in command 
and 8taff observations, penetrating as that would the war-fighting strategies 
and unit tactics more than would observations of large-scale exercises. 
Correspondingly, reaetions to a NATO proposal for an annual exehange 
of «detailed data on ... military budget [s)>> for the next year, with other 
(6) Conversations with milítary attaches af NSWP states hl Washington, D. C. during 
July-August, 1990 exhibited views about the need for observations af command/ 
/staff excrcises and differences betwcen, for cxamplc. Bulgaria and Hungary regarding the 
J-h;ngarian proposal- discused below - for Zones af National Confidence. 
(1) Interview with Ambassador Malesca, Arms ContraI Today (May, 1990). 
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states having the right to question the submitting govemment on details - has 
reeeived better response irom Czeehoslovakia and Hungary than anywhere 
else in the Paet. 
By mid-May, as the Sixth Round ended, more NATO CSBM proposals 
were tabled, pushing the eonfidence-building envelope further in a couple 
important directions. Under one proposal, data about a nation's intended 
enhaneements of force struetures and mobility would be readily available. 
A seeond notion tabled by NATO woul build a eonflict management role 
into CSBMs and details how a state may use the CSCE process to ask for 
clarifieation if non-notified out of garrison aetivity «of a militarily signi-
fieant nature» is begun by another country. 
For both of these, the USSR has responded with eaution, and less than 
ful! endorsement. Again, the Czechoslovaks and Hungarians were among 
the first to endorse this NATO idea. The Soviet «goslow» view has been 
supported most by Bulgaria, and somewhat by Poland and Romania in the 
latest round. These countries have eountered with a number of arguments, 
including that naval and air activities ought to be a party of any CSBM 
accord if there is to be an comprehensive enhaneement of Stoekholm. 
Compromises, offered by both NNA states and by smaller members 
of both NATO and the Paet, will be effeeted, bowing for now to the 
reluctance of the U. S. and USSR. A modest 1990 CSBM enhaneement will, 
then, include some greater data exehanges on budgets, an implementation 
review meeting eaeh year, and better eommunications and more contacts. 
To these, al! NSWP eountries will agree, although their enthusiasm is a 
function of their own security perception and threat assessments. A «summit 
worthy agreement» is variously defined among NSWP states, and is unders-
tood through the prism of eaeh state's self-interes!. 
EASTERN EUROPE AND THE CASE FOR FUTURE CSBMs 
CFE I will not, of course, ensure numerical party among geographic 
neighbors in East-Central and Southeastem Europe. Given the alliance to 
alliance nature of these talks, large regional and subregional imbalances will 
remain or grow, partieularly if new bilateral alliances or ententes emerge 
against a perceived common enemy. Even if there were numerieal parity, 
however, stability and security are not necessary consequences. 
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Stabilizing measures that limit 01' prohibit activities by national military 
forces (maneuvers, deployments, mobilization, training, supplying), and 
thereby clarify, reveal and reassure about other state's intentions are needed ('). 
Clarifying intentions is of paramount importance in East-Central and 
Southeastern Europe. These are regions of numerous bilateral and intra-
state disputes 01' conflicts that may be harbingers of far larger confronta-
tions. Where there used to be constraints on nationalism due to Soviet 
hegemony, there is now a far larger opportunity for the voices of irre-
dentism, ethnic rivalries and national interests. 
Areas of real and potential conflict include: 
- The German-Polish bordel', where disputes concerning ownership 
of property in Poland once held by German citizens and the two 
states' conflicting claims about rights in the Ballic are both likely to 
recur notwithstanding the German Parliamen!'s reassurances about 
the Oder-Neisse frontier; 
- Poland versus Byelorussia, the Ukraine and/or Lithuania concer-
ning the Eastern bordel' of Poland (since the end of World War II 
at the Bug River), about which nationalists on both sides argue 
fiercely; 
- Hungary versus Romania regarding the Hungarian minority in Transyl-
vania and that region in general as a territorial issue going back to the 
Treaty of Trianon in 1920 and before; 
- Albanians versus Serbs conceming Albanians in Kosovo and Serbian 
treatment of them there, with Serbian leader Milosevic relying on 
the anti-Albanian sentiment as a key component of his popular 
appeal; 
- Bulgaria versus Yugoslavia oveI' Macedonia, with Bulgarians sus-
picious of Macedonia nationalism and Serbian sponsorship of it, 
resurgent in 1990 as the organization called «llinden»; 
(!) The distinction belween two dimensions af states' military cffort - the extraction af 
human and material resources to build and maintain anned forces Bnd the performance 
af the armed forces and military economy has becn made in a number af roy earlier studies. 
Sec, for example, «Dimensions of Military Commitments in Eastern Europe and the USSR: 
1977-1987», Arms ControI Vorl 10, Number 3 (Decemher. 1989), pp. 275-288. Sec also, 
Daniel N. Nelson, ~The Distribution of Military Bffort in the Warsaw Pact», in Joiot 
Economic Committee, Pressures for Reform in lhe East European Economies Volume 1 
(Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1989), pp. 187·207). 
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- Greece versus Yugoslavia over Macedonia, with Greece denying 
the existence of a Macedonian identity, and border tensions high 
due to influx of people from the Yugoslav «Macedonian» republic; 
- The Soviet Union versus Romania over Moldavia, with the ethnic 
Romanian population of the Moldavian SSR demanding cultural and 
politicai autonomy, and the unity of Moldavia with Romania being 
sought by nationalist advocates on both sides of the border while 
Moscow's approach has been to deny that abrupt reunification can take 
place; 
- Bulgaria versus Turkey concerning tbe Turkish minority witbin Bul-
garia, and the Bulgarian perception of Turkish interference and 
tbreats; 
- Bulgaria versus Romania concerning Dobrudja, a territory on tbe 
Black Sea coast divided between Romania and Bulgaria which Bul-
garia claims entirely for itself, and concerning cross - Danubian pollu-
tion and ancillary issues (')_ 
There is, then, an ample number of disputes, some having the requisite 
volatility to denote an existing security tbreat in East-Central or Southeastern 
Europe_ To these we should add the longstanding animosity between Greece 
and Turkey over Cyprus and the Aegean, and a variety of otber smaller 
issues that, while not severe, damage relations among countries (e_ g., the 
argument between Hungary and Czechoslovakia about payment for the huge 
Danubian dam project that has now been canceled). 
Disputes, tensions and confrontations along the planes noted above are 
more dangerous and more likely to precipitate violence because Eastern 
Europe is without the mediating influence of multilateral treaty organizations. 
Driven only by tbe visceral issues of peoples and borders, not by strategic 
goals of an alliance, individual nation-states wilI find it difficult to resist 
the power of nationalism. This is not to say that Leonid Brezhnev's image 
of the Warsaw Pact as an instrument of enforce constraints on sovereignty 
was preferable. Rather, there must be a clear understanding that Central and 
Eastern Europe have inherited new insecurities as they have regained sove-
(~ For a more complete discussion af the bilateral disputes in the Balkans, see my 
article ilThe Warsaw Treat!y Organization and Southeast European Political·Military Security» 
in 'Paul Shoup and George Hoffman, eds. Problems of Balkan Security (Washington, D. C.: 
The Wilson Center Press. 1990), pp. 123-150. 
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reignly - and Ihal these insecurilies are nol bening for Europe as a whole. That 
the Warsaw Pac!'s potential for surprise attack is past can be applauded. 
As the Pact has unraveled, however, we find a discomfiting scene of rivalries 
and disputes, and little in the way of a collective security mechanism to cons-
train perceptions of threat. 
The decisive tum towards a national vision of security has been evident 
empirically in the mix of multilateral (two or more states in alliance), 
bilateral, or purely national ground-force exercises among WTO members. 
As required by the 1986 Stockholm Accord, CSCE states must give prior notifi-
cation 42 days in advance of military activities involving more than 13 000 
troops 01' 300 battle tanks. By 1989, notifiable national exercises (twenty-three) 
were twice as frequent as bilateral maneuvers (eleven), and almost eight times 
as frequent as multinational exercises (three). By comparison, during the 
1961-69 period, multinational exercises were three times as numerous as 
bilateral maneuvers, and six times as frequent as national exercises. From 1970 
through 1979, multilateral training among WTO armies was only 1.67 times 
the number of bilateral exercises, with the number of single-country maneu-
vers still small by comparison ("). That Warsaw Pact military cooperation, 
and the notion of coalitional warfare have (hus been replaced by a much more 
nalional military strategy in the late 1980s seems eorroborated by these data. 
CSBM INITlATlVES FROM NSWP STATES 
Because of tensions evident in region from the Baltie to the Bosporus, and 
the absenee of multinational frameworks to determine war-fighting strategies, 
the new governments of Eastem Europe have shown interest in measures that 
establish nalional thresholds. Beeause of new complexities in the seeurity 
pieture of East- Central and Southeastem Europe, emphasis is being given to 
(l0) Thcsc comparisons are the author's calculations based on data in The Arms Contrai 
Reporter (1987, 1988, 1989, Section 402); the S/PRl Yearbook, 1989 (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versit:y Press, 1989), pp. 339-344: Richard f, Starr, Ed., Yearbook on International Communist 
Alfairs (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press. 1989), p. 438; and Heinz Gartner, «New 
Concepts of Constraints, 'Stabilizing Measures' and CSBMs», paper delivered at the 1990 
Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association (April 10·14, 1990). Early WTO 
maneuvers are discussed in Jeffrey Simon, Warsaw Pac! Forces (Boulder. Colorado: Westview. 
1985). 
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accords Ihal apply to lhe pOlencial use of force by any one slale againsl 
anolher. Slrictiy speaking, of course, such limils lie oulside exisling defi-
nitions of CSBMs. Yel, lhe blurring of lines belween CFE and CSBM la!ks, 
and lhe need lo unite Ihem in lhe nexl phase of European security nego-
liations, is seen by NSWP slales as axiomalic of lhe politicai Iransformalion 
of lhe conlinent. 
Enhancing security of NSWP slales wil! nol be achieved merely by 
reducing lhe size, armamenls and deploymenls of slanding forces. Furlher 
safeguards - CSBMs Ihal would make Iransparenl lhe inlenlion lo mobilize 
reserve and eadre formations, or to retrieve weapons, ammunition and equipo 
ment from storage - become even more necessary whcn active·duty militaries 
are at low leveis. II is at low leveis when national mobilization capacitites 
become very dangerous ("). Where tangible bilateral disputes exist lhat could 
motivate one state to resort to intimidation ar armed attack against another, 
national thresholds for everything lhat could facilitate a rapid recreation of 
threatening force leveis, coupled with inspection regimes to assure neighbors 
of compliance, are necessary. 
Thus far, however, proposals concerning national thresholds from NSWP 
stales have not provided lhe specifics that would lend themselves to pro-
ductive negotiations. New governments installed after elections in the firs! 
half of 1990 have uniform1y expressed interest in furthering CSBMs ("), bul 
only the Hungarians have begun to spell out ways in which ceilings for the 
readiness ar disposition of military assets could be verified. The Hunga· 
rians have been willing, for example, to experiment with «open skies» veri-
Cication involving Canadian flights over Hungarian territory. Canadian Chief 
of Staff John de Chastelain was in Budapest in July, 1990 to explore with Hun· 
garian Chief of Staff Laszlo Borsits means by which to implement airborne 
verification of olher states' military equipment. 
The Hungarian delegation to CSCE/CSBM negotiations in Vienna and 
the Hungarian military have also been active in considering specific ways 
(II) For 8 discussion of 5uch dangers see Richard Ned Lebow, «Windows of Qpportunity: 
Do Stiltes Jump Through Them?», International Security Vai 9, No. I, Summer 1984, 
pp. 147-186. 
(11) For example, the new Romanian Foreign Ministcr, Adrian Nastase's address to 
the Geneva Disannament Conference spoke of lhe need for a «... multiplication and 
diversification of confidence and securitly building measures o •• », but provided no details. 
ROMPRES dispatch, August 3, 1990, as reprinted in FBIS-EEU 90-151 (August 6. 1990), p. 44. 
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in which, in a follow-on to a CFE accord, the states of East-Central and 
Southeastern Europe might enhance their security vis-a-vis each other _ ln 
Vienna, a number of engoing bilateral discussions have been initiated by the 
Hungarians conceming locations and amounts of equipment and weaponry 
that would have to be inspected its neighbors (")_ 
Hungary is, of course, particularly concemed about Romania and vice 
versa_ From Budapest, it is worrisome to see the revival of the reactionary 
element of Romania politics in «Vatra Romaneasca» (Romanian Hearth) 
from which denunciations of «Magyar plots» to «change the borders established 
by the Treaty of Trianon» are frequent (") _ Even moderate Romanian 
newspapers are carrying provocative articles denouncing an alleged history 
of Hungarian duplicity, and waming against entrusting Romanian security 
to the «good intentions» of Hugarians who « ... never observed any agreement, 
convention or treaty» (l'). 
The new Hungarian Defense Minister, Lajos Fur, has recognized the 
volatility of such an environment. With Romanian Defense Minister Victor 
Stanculescu's approval, officers of the two armies have met quietly at border 
locations to reduce tensions, and to exchange information concerning the 
disposition of their forces in the vicinity of their lengthy frontier ("). This 
exchange, of course, is purely ad hoc, and does not establish the basis for 
bilateral CSBM because no agreement for regular meetings has been suggested. 
Neither do these encounters presage a later regional agreement on national 
thresholds. Nevertheless, the defense establishments of these two potential 
(Il) Austrian officers at tbe National Defense AcadetDIY. for example, told me in May, 
1990 of discussioDS with counterparts in the Hungarian armed forces concerning the diffi-
cuIdes af inspection. Hungarian CSCE negotiators, aiso in Apdl and Mar, 1990, spoke af 
their angaing efforts to meet with other delegations 00 a one-to-one basis to consider the 
technical aspects af ensuring nationaI thresholds for transportation assets, stored weapons 
and other equipment that could ease mobilization. 
(14) The Hungarian press picks up allY Vatra commentary, whether made in Romania 
ar elsewhere. See, for example, the Budapest Domcstic Radio report af July 31, 1990 
translated in FBIS-EEU 90-148 (August I, 1990), p. 55 as -«Vatra Politician Claims TranS')'I-
vania Coveted». 
('5) See Dimineata (July 21, 1990), p. 4. 
(16) I was informed of these eontaets by Romanian officials in Bueharest in late April 
aod early May, 1990. Moy informants, however, eould not provide to me speeifie dates or 
locations of face to face talks between Hungarian and Romanian military officers, except 
to say that the meetings were at border locations, were ongoing, and involved high-ranking 
active-duty military officers. 
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belligerents are not anxious to confront one another, and have inaugurated 
a limited, and non-publicized bilateral information exchange. This endeavor 
may have avoided heightened military tensions, particular1y in March and 
April, 1990 when etnic unrest was causing fatalities in Transylvania, and 
when emigration form Romania was reaching very high leveIs. 
A second CSBM arena that may develop further due to initiatives from 
NSWP states, are «zones of national confidence» (ZNCs) in which there 
would be drastic reductions of border forces and a ban on the conduct of 
maneuvers of any kind. 
The Hungarians, once again, have been in the forefront of this effort. 
ln November, 1989, Hungary acted as host for a meeting of states in the 
so-cal1ed Alpe-Adria region, i. e. Hungary, Italy, Austria and Yugoslavia. The 
then-Foreign Minister of Hungary, Gyula Horn, proposed a ZNC with seve-
ral specific atlributes: 
1) the mutual withdrawal of ali offensive military forces fifty kilometers 
from common frontiers, whithin which only border guards and 
defensive equipment would be aIlowed; 
2) the exchange of information on the size and location or forces within 
that zone; 
3) the limitation of the size and frequency of exercises throughout the 
territory of the four states, and the constraint of each country's 
capacity to mobilize forces (through unspecified steps); 
4) the invitation of observers to al1 military exercises and the regular 
inspection of the ZNC's. 
The Hungarian proposal went nowhere at that November, 1989 meeting. 
Italy issued a flat <<fiO» to the idea, Austria said that it had no offensive arms 
in the 50 kilometer zone, and Yugoslavia said that it would cost too much 
to implement the Hungarian ideas. 
But the notion of ZNCs has not died quickly. On July 31, 1990, a 
two-day Adria-Danube conference was convened in Veruce. This group of five 
nation-states - Hungary, Austria, Czechoslovakla, Yugoslavia and Italy - has 
been labeled the «Pentagonale». Regional cooperation of this kind does 
not necessarily mean movement on CSBMs and, indeed, much of the Venice 
discussion was devoted to economic cooperation, environmental concerns and 
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the furlherance of parliamentary demoeraey and human rights ("). Never· 
lheless, the group's final communique spoke of its aims in terms of eontri-
buting to seeurity and stability in lhe region within the CSCE contexto 
Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky, responding to questions about 
the results of lhe Veniee meeting, emphasized the Pentagonale's potential for 
mediating disputes through the role of intermediaries (18). Mention of a 
Carpathian-Tisza regional association was also made by Jeszenszky, implying 
thoughts in Budapest about an eastward-Iooking ZNC ("). 
Zones of National Confidenee are in many ways an outgrowth of a11 
extensive academie literature on non-offensive defense and struetural defen-
siveness lhat has developed considerably in the Iast deeade. The visions of 
analysts sueh as Albrecht von Muller, Horst Afheldt and Lutz Underseher have 
been widely discussed and criticized eIsewhere, and need not be reviewed 
here ("). Inherent to most of lhe images of security without offensive arms, 
however, are zones along frontiers from which armored forces (and other 
«offensive» weapons) would be removed. Within such zones, in more radical 
proposaIs, one would find «technically advanced defense armament systems» 
manned by few personneI and largely immobile. Less radical visions suggest 
these «nets» coupled with residual mobile and active armored reserves in 
central areas that could isolate and defeat any forces that tried to break 
through lhe frontier zones. 
Sinee the mid 1980s, Hungarian scholars were partieularly enamored 
with lhese visions of European defense, and contributed often to internationaI 
conferences where such ideas have been laborated ("). Hungarian communist 
(17) A Czecholosvak summary af the Pentagonal Group's meeting was contained in the 
Czech newspaper Hospodarske Noviny (August 2. 1990), pages 1 and 8. 
(lI) See the transcript af this August 5, 1990 interview 00 Budapest Television as trans· 
lated in FBIS-EEU 90-151 (August 6, 1990), p. 31. 
(19) Jeszenszky's interview with Budapest Domestic Service OD July 31, 1990 is carried 
in FBIS·EEU 90·148 (Au,ost I, 1990), p. 34. 
(20) See, for example. Horst Afheldt. Defensive Verteidigung (Reinbeck bei Hamburg: 
Rohwolt. 1983); Albrecht von Muller. «Confidence Building by Hardware Measures: The 
Idea af Benign Defence». Background Paper, 34th Pugwash Conference, Bjork1iden. 1984; 
and Lutz Unterseher. «Fur eine tragfahige Verteidigung der Bundesrepublik», in Studien-
gruppe Alternative Sicherheitspolitik: Strukturwandel der Verteidigung (OpIade: Westdeutscber 
Verlag, 1984). 
fi) The Hungarians have been a principal supporter aI the Pugwash Conference 00 
Science and Warld Affairs. Examples of their thinking on structural defensiveness can be 
found in «Backsround MateriaIs on Structural Defensivenesslt. 36th Pugwash Conference 
on Science and World MfaÍrs (Budapest, September 1-6, 1986). 
48 
CONFIDENCE AND SECURlTY - BUILDING MEASURES lN EASTERN EUROPE 
palty politicians, sensing their tenuous hold on power and the antipathy of 
the public towards military alliances, picked up on the idea of structural 
defensiveness and began to inc1ude such a concept in the regime's security 
policy ("). Similarly, the July, 1987 «Jaruze1ski Plan» for European secu-
rity placed considerable emphasis on structural defensiveness. Soviet analysts 
have also been vocal in advocating defensive military doctrines lhat cite lhe 
sarne literature ("). These views continue to resonate in NSWP positions 
on CSBMs, particularly insofar as there is interest in making ZNCs a test-bed 
for non-offensive defense. 
From Czechoslovakia, olher CSBM ideas have been promoted. West 
German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher had proposed on January 31, 
1990 the creation of a «European Conflict Center» as one of ten institutions 
to implement lhe CSCE process ("). The Czechoslovak position, first raised 
in the Havei governrnent's April «Memorandum on European Security 
Commission», suggest an organ of that name that would serve in many capa-
cities, inc1uding 
«Forestalling threats to European peace and security, the rise of 
exacerbated situations, disputes, military incidents and conflicts and 
recommending as well as offering means of lheir settlement ... » 
More intriguing in the April Memorandum, perhaps, is lhe Czechoslovaks' 
suggestion for a «Military Commitee» subordinated to such a pan-European 
organization. By mid-1990, Czechoslovaks have begun to talk about «escala-
tion control forces», which we might understand to mean peacekeeping forces, 
under the control of the Military Committee. There is thus far no c1ear 
genesis of such forces, except through the vague process of contributions of 
lightly armed units form CSCE member states. How decisions would be 
made to commit such forces to a particular locale, e. g., to take up positions 
(12) 00 December 10, 1986, Gyula Horn, the State Secretary in the Minisrty of Foreign 
Affairs af Hungary, spoke to an intemational conference 00 security policy in FIorence. Italy. 
At that meeting, he arqued for a Europe in which ~sufficient security» served as the policy 
guideline for each state and for «discarding offensive weapons from the system». See Nepsza-
badsag (Oecember 11, 1986). 
(23) See, for example, a Kokoshin and V. Larionov, «Kurskaya vitvav svetie sovremennoi 
oboronyitylenoi doktrini», Mirovaya Ekonomika i MezhduJUlrodniye Otnosheniya (1987.88), 
pp. 3240. 
(24) See ~German Unity Wíthin the European Framework», Speech bY Foreígn Mínister 
Hans Dietrich Genscher at the Conference of the Tutzing Protestant Academy, published in 
Statements and Speeches, Volume XIII, No 2 (February 6, 1990). 
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on the Turkish-Bulgarian border to separate forces of the !wo states, is 
also unelear. 
Nevertheless, the Czeehoslovak Foreign Ministry is fuIly eommitted to 
the notion of an elaborate pan-European seeurity system, artieulated by 
Foreign Minister liri Dienstbier in early April just after the publieation of the 
above-mentioned Memorandum ("). Inberent to this system would be both 
diplomatie means by which to contain connict, and auxiliary military 
cooperation. Thus far, the Czechoslovaks have not formalized the idea of 
having «Europeanized» units that would be deployed in the field to prevent 
the escalation of conflict by interposing themselves between potential ar 
actual combatants. It is nevertheless clear fram their April Memorandum, and 
from subsequent discussions outside formal Vienna CSCE/CSBM negotiations, 
that they foresee a new security structure having a military commission that 
confronts incidents and conflicts between armed forces of !wo ar more states. 
This can extend weIl beyond making military activities predictable and open; 
it may imply the establishment of on-sile military observers to monitor a 
truce, a ceasefire, ar a situation judged to be so tense that hostilities are 
imminent. 
CSBMs AND THE FUTURE OF EAST EUROPEAN SECURITY 
Because the Baltic to Basporus corridor is suffused with issues af 
peoples and borders, neilher CFE I nor any subsequent arms contrai agreement 
that reduces leveis of manpower and weaponry of standing forces, ar with-
draws them from Central Europe, will obviate security uncertainties. Indeed, 
&bsent a number of important CSBMs, lower leveis may tend to push leaders 
into mobilization more quickly, thel'eby raising the risk of escalation - a sce-
nario I have referred to elsewhere as «high-tech 1914» ("). Hungary and Cze-
choslovakia have been at the forefront of developing and airing new Ideas f.or 
Atlantic-to-the-Urals (ATTU) security structures and accompanying CSBMs. 
Romania's new leaders have been far too occupied with domestic turmoil 
(25) Czechoslovak Foreign Ministl1Y affieial Jiri Stepanovsky discussed these propasaIs in 
some detail in a paper entitled «The Future af tbe Warsaw Pact and European Security» 
at a SIPRI sponsored conference on «NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the 19905» in Stockholm, 
June 11-13. 1990. 
(26) See my essa}' «CSCE Challenge:: Preventing a High-Tech 1914», in Defense and 
Disarmament Alternatives VaI. 3, Nos. 6 e 7 (June/July, 1990). 
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to offer anything more than verbal endorsements of CSCE, and Bulgaria 
remains reluctant to stray too far from Moscow, while exploring much 
closer relations with Greece (with which Bulgaria shares two adversaries 
- Turks and Macedonians) ("). 
Poland's approach, seeing German reunification the most likely threat to 
the integrity of the existing Polish frontiers, has been to advocate larger 
pan-European security structures while avoiding any rapid decoupling from 
the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Foreign Minister Skubiszewski has expressed 
the desire to « ... create the means to prevent conflicts 01' .•• if lhat is not 
possible ... to settle them» ("). But the Polish position has yet to offer the 
more substantive suggestions of Hungarian or Czechoslovak policy-makers. 
National ceilings for forces and equipment (and ways to verify these), 
zones of national confidence (ZNCs) along borders, and perhaps «escalation 
control forces» deployable to trouble-spots throughout the region have been 
the principal avenues for NSWP (especially Hungarian and Czechoslovak) 
CSBM innovation. ln addition, there has been a willingness to adhere to earlier 
WTO pronoucements about the need for prior notification and observation 
of naval and air exercises. 
Of these, national thresholds will necessarily be part of the next stage 
in European arms control- wich a new set of negotiations, combining CFE II 
and further CSBMs, will have to undertake. ZNCs will require ongoing bila-
teral and, perhaps, regional discussions (e. g., within the «Pentagonale» group 
01' olher.); uniform standards for such zones throughout the ATTU region 
would be untenable. Escalation control forces - peacekeeping units - seem 
furthest from implementation. An institutionalization of a new security 
architecture, with ali of its operational rules in place, would be a prerequisite 
for any security instrument involving the deployment of troops 01' observers 
in a conflictual situation. 
Notwithstanding these limitations on any new CSBMs applied to the 
region of NSWP states, there is an eamest reassessment underway in each 
of the six states that were active members of the WTO. Sovereign but not 
(11) 00 Bulgaria's emerging post-communist security policies, see Daniel N. Nelson, 
«Bulgarian Politicai Dynamics and Security Policies» Berichte des Bundesinstituts lur ostwis-
senscha/tliche und internationale Studien (Koln: BIOis, 1990). 
(28) Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Krzysztof Skubiszewski discussed tbc Mazowiecki 
govenunent's vicw of European security in Tygodnik Powszechny (June 10, 1990). 
51 
NAÇÃO E DEFESA 
nccessarily secure, there is a casting about among NSWP states for new ways 
by which to reassure themselves that implicit threats do not escalate into 
imminent dangers. CSBMs will increasingly be a route for enhancing their 
security, and we can expect more ideas, and heightened advocacy for trans-
parency of and limitations on military activities by these erstwhile Soviet 
allies. 
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